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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This appeal arises from a dispute concerning coverage 
under a savings and loan blanket fidelity bond the appellee, 
Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland ("F&D"), issued 
to City Federal Savings Bank ("City Federal"), in 1987. In 
particular, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
("FDIC"), as statutory successor to the Resolution Trust 
Company ("RTC"), appeals the district court's order of 
summary judgment entered against it on January 29, 1998, 
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on its action on the bond.1 It contends that the district 
court erred in holding that no reasonable jury could 
conclude, based on the evidence presented, that City 
Federal "discovered" a covered loss within the bond period 
as required by the bond's terms for there to be coverage. In 
response, F&D asserts that the district court's ruling on the 
discovery issue is correct, and that alternatively, it is 
entitled to summary judgment because the loss City 
Federal sustained is not covered by the bond. For the 
reasons that follow, we will reverse the district court's order 
of summary judgment, and remand the matter to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
II. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS 
 
A. Background 
 
We draw the relevant facts from the district court's 
opinion and the parties' submissions in the summary 
judgment proceedings before the district court. 2 See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 1. The RTC originally filed the complaint in the district court, but the 
FDIC, as the RTC's statutory successor, has taken this appeal. See 12 
U.S.C. S 1441a(m). As a matter of convenience we refer to the appellant 
as the RTC. 
 
2. In this appeal, the parties rely specifically on the "12G Statement of 
Undisputed Facts" the RTC submitted in opposition to F&D's motion for 
summary judgment, see app. at 125-175, as well as the "12G Statement 
of Undisputed Facts" the RTC submitted in opposition to individual 
defendant Lyndon Merkle's motion for summary judgment. See SA at 39- 
105. Those statements, in turn, set forth the historical facts giving rise 
to this dispute. Because neither party has contested the accuracy of the 
historical facts set forth in the 12G statements, and in view of the 
circumstance that all of the relevant deposition testimony is not in the 
record before this court, we have relied on those factual statements and 
other portions of the record in deciding this appeal. However, to the 
extent that the parties' briefs indicate that there are disputed facts, we 
will refer to the RTC's version because we must view the facts in the 
light 
 
most favorable to it, the non-movant before the district court. 
 
We also note that the parties submitted separate appendices in this 
appeal. We refer to the RTC's appendix as "App. at ___," and F&D's 
appendix as "SA at ___." 
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Resolution Trust Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., No. 92-1003, 
slip op. (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 1998) (hereinafter "Op. at ___"). 
Because this appeal is intensely fact-driven, it is necessary 
to set forth the factual background in some detail. 
 
On March 22, 1987, F&D issued a "Savings and Loan 
Blanket Bond" ("the bond"), Standard Form No. 22, naming 
as insureds City Federal and its wholly-owned subsidiary 
City Collateral and Financial Services, Inc. ("City 
Collateral"). City Collateral was City Federal's mortgage 
warehouse lending operation.3 Among other things, the 
bond provided fidelity insurance, and stated that F&D 
would indemnify City Federal or its subsidiaries up to $5 
million against losses it might suffer because of certain 
dishonest or fraudulent acts by its employees. The bond 
expired on March 22, 1989. 
 
During the effective period of the bond, Willem Ridder 
("Ridder"), John Hurst ("Hurst"), Lyndon Merkle ("Merkle") 
and Gregory DeVany ("DeVany") were City Federal and City 
Collateral employees, serving City Collateral in the following 
capacities: (1) Ridder was the president of City Collateral 
and Hurst's supervisor; (2) Hurst was a vice president of 
City Collateral, the director of financial services and 
DeVany's supervisor; (3) Merkle was a senior financial 
services officer and also a vice president of City Collateral; 
and (4) DeVany was a financial services officer and an 
assistant vice president of City Collateral. Unless we 
otherwise note, we will refer to these persons collectively as 
the "individual defendants." 
 
In June 1987, Kevin Corcoran ("Corcoran"), a City 
Collateral loan officer, presented City Federal's Executive 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The district court described the nature of a mortgage warehouse 
lending operation: 
 
       First, a mortgage warehouse lender such as City Collateral advances 
       money to a mortgage banker to fund mortgages on real property. In 
       return, the lender is given the mortgage notes as security for the 
       loan. Then, the mortgage banker sells the mortgage notes to the 
       Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or some other investor 
       and tells the lender to forward the mortgage notes to that 
investor. 
 
       The lender sends the notes to the investor, and then the mortgage 
       banker uses the proceeds of the sale to repay the lender. 
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Committee ("Executive Committee") and Officer's Loan 
Committee ("Loan Committee") with a proposal for a lending 
arrangement whereby City Collateral would extend a $30 
million warehouse credit line to Northwest Mortgage 
Company ("Northwest"). Northwest, a New Jersey company, 
originated residential mortgage loans and sold them to 
investors individually or in pools. At all times relevant to 
this case, Harry Movroydis ("Movroydis") was the president 
of Northwest. On June 16, 1987, City Federal and 
Northwest executed a "Master Mortgage Loan Warehousing 
Agreement" (the "master agreement") and related 
documents setting forth the terms and conditions of the 
lending arrangement. 
 
In March 1988, Corcoran left employment at City 
Collateral, but before his departure, he told Hurst about 
certain problems he had experienced with the Northwest 
credit line. On or about April 1, 1988, Hurst and DeVany 
took over administration of the Northwest credit line. From 
approximately April 1, 1988, to November 1988, Merkle 
generated "exception reports" pertaining to the Northwest 
credit line and delivered those reports to both Hurst and 
DeVany. These reports provided the following information: 
(1) total amount of collateral that had been shipped to 
third-party investors for purchase but for which City 
Federal remained unpaid for at least 30 days (referring to 
these loans as "shipped loans"), and (2) total amount of 
collateral that had not been shipped to third-party investors 
for purchase and for which City Federal had not been 
repaid by Northwest for at least 180 days from City 
Collateral's funding of the loan (referring to these loans as 
"warehoused loans"). Despite the fact that the exception 
reports for the Northwest credit line indicated numerous 
problems with the Northwest collateral, Hurst and DeVany 
did not distribute the reports to City Federal officials during 
the relevant time period. 
 
In May 1988, Hurst wrote to Movroydis to inform him 
that Northwest was in violation of the master agreement. 
About the same time, DeVany and another City Collateral 
employee found difficulties with Northwest's list of 
commitments from third parties to buy notes and 
mortgages. DeVany did not report the problems to City 
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Federal's Real Estate Finance Committee. Despite these 
problems, Hurst recommended that the Loan Committee 
extend the maturity date of the credit line from May 31, 
1988, to June 30, 1988. Moreover, Hurst did not inform the 
Loan Committee that the Northwest credit line was in 
technical default as of that time. 
 
In June 1988, Hurst wrote to Northwest about a 
"workout plan" for the credit line to cure the violations of 
the master agreement. In July 1988, City Collateral put the 
credit line on its internal "watch list," which meant that the 
Northwest account had been identified as a problem credit. 
The individual defendants did not inform City Federal of 
this fact. Moreover, between June and September 1988, 
City Collateral continued to extend credit to Northwest 
while it closely monitored the loan. As F&D points out in its 
brief, the evidence demonstrates that there were 
improvements with Northwest's credit line during the 
summer of 1988. Northwest was able to reduce its 
warehoused loans from $8,036,027 as of June 30, 1998, to 
zero as of September 30, 1988. The shipped loans dropped 
from $7,040,357 as of June 30, 1988, to $5,695,890 as of 
September 30, 1988. 
 
In or about May 1988, and coincidentally around the 
same time period that the Northwest credit line's maturity 
date was extended for the first time, Ridder, Hurst and 
Merkle learned from James McTernan ("McTernan"), a City 
Federal officer, that City Federal planned to sell City 
Collateral. According to the RTC, upon learning of City 
Federal's intent to sell City Collateral, Hurst, Ridder and 
Merkle promptly initiated discussions with City Federal 
about their potential compensation if the sale were 
consummated. Apparently, Ridder, Hurst and Merkle 
negotiated what the parties call "golden handcuff 
agreements" or "closing agreements" with City Collateral 
throughout the summer and into the fall of 1988. See SA at 
48. 
 
As part of the effort to sell City Collateral, Drexel 
Burnham Lambert, Inc. prepared an offering memorandum 
that described City Collateral's business and corporate 
structure as well as its loan credits. Ridder, Hurst and 
Merkle worked on the credit section of this document, in 
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particular providing information for the section of the 
offering memorandum entitled "Workouts and Litigation." 
Although the Northwest credit line was in a "workout" 
status as of that time, they did not include it in this section 
of the offering memorandum. City Federal distributed the 
offering memorandum during the summer of 1988 to 
potential purchasers. 
 
In September 1988, DeVany (under Hurst's supervision) 
prepared a written recommendation to extend and renew 
the Northwest credit line to June 1989, and in late 
September 1988, DeVany presented it to City Federal's loan 
committees. The report, and DeVany's oral presentation, 
omitted negative facts relating to the Northwest credit line, 
including, inter alia, its "workout" status and Northwest's 
technical default under the master agreement. The report 
also underestimated Northwest's risk rating in view of the 
various problems with the account. Indeed, F&D admits in 
its brief that while there appears to be a factual dispute as 
to what DeVany said at the committee presentation, giving 
the RTC every reasonable inference, "the most that can be 
said is that the Employees concealed the Northwest default 
and the workout plan in progress in order to induce City 
Federal to extend the loan." Br. at 7. Moreover, the record 
indicates that in September 1988, Hurst represented to 
City Federal that the Northwest credit line would be 
included in any future City Collateral sale. Nevertheless, 
Hurst told City Collateral employees in August and October 
1988, that the Northwest credit line would not be included 
in any City Collateral sale. 
 
After the September 1988 presentation, City Federal's 
committees accepted DeVany's recommendation to renew 
and extend the Northwest credit line, but conditioned its 
acceptance on Northwest's completion of certain conditions. 
As it turned out, Northwest failed to satisfy the stated 
conditions, and on or about December 5, 1988, DeVany 
halted funding on the credit line. There is evidence 
indicating that DeVany halted funding under Hurst's 
direction, but that none of the individual defendants 
informed anyone at City Federal of the situation as of that 
time. 
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Meanwhile, sometime in the fall of 1988, the parent 
corporation of HonFed Bank ("HonFed"), a federally insured 
savings bank based in Hawaii, expressed interest in 
purchasing City Collateral. The RTC states that"according 
to the deposition testimony of Hurst, by late October to 
early November, Hurst, Ridder and Merkle were confident 
that HonFed was going to purchase City Collateral and that 
HonFed planned to employ them after the sale." Br. at 9. 
Coincidentally (or not), on October 21, 1988, City Collateral 
signed closing agreements with Ridder, Hurst and Merkle, 
providing each with substantial sums of money, i.e., the 
"golden handcuff payments," if City Federal sold City 
Collateral and each of them provided assistance with the 
City Collateral sale. Under the agreements each was to 
"render such additional assistance as may be necessary to 
assist and expedite the sale, transfer or assignment of [City 
Collateral]." The amount of compensation Ridder, Hurst 
and Merkle received under the agreements depended upon 
a number of factors, including, inter alia, City Federal's 
gross profit from the sale and whether each obtained 
employment with the purchaser after the sale. Also, they 
could collect their payments only if the sale occurred before 
March 31, 1989, and they were not terminated for cause 
before the deal closed. The RTC also states that during the 
same time period, presumably by late October or early 
November 1988, Hurst, Ridder and Merkle were negotiating 
their future employment contracts with HonFed. Br. at 9. 
 
Sometime in November 1988, DeVany began to create a 
"customer history" on the Northwest Loan that he kept in 
City Federal's files. The history summarized activities 
involving the credit line. On November 28, 1988, HonFed 
signed a letter of intent to purchase City Collateral and 
began its due diligence process. The letter of intent 
obligated HonFed to purchase all of City Collateral's loans 
except those that were "non-performing or otherwise 
substandard." Moreover, the letter of intent expressed that 
one of the conditions of the sale was that Hurst, Ridder and 
Merkle would agree to join HonFed. 
 
During its due diligence, HonFed reviewed the exception 
reports from the Northwest credit line. Testimony from 
Kathy Durham of HonFed indicates that HonFed rated the 
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Northwest credit line as a "watch" based on its history of 
losses and stale loans. A few days prior to the closing, 
HonFed notified City Federal that it was excluding the 
Northwest credit line from the sale. 
 
In December 1988, DeVany met with Movroydis to 
discuss the situation with the credit line. At the meeting, 
which appeared at first in the customer history as having 
occurred on December 29, 1988, Movroydis admitted that 
he wrongfully had diverted collateral securing the loans 
obtained from City Collateral. Apparently, Movroydis was 
involved in what the parties refer to as a "kiting scheme," 
whereby he diverted the funds Northwest owed to City 
Collateral to cover marketing losses that Northwest had 
sustained in April and October 1987. DeVany did not tell 
anyone at City Federal of this admission at that time, but 
DeVany testified that he told Hurst about it. Apparently, 
the RTC learned in discovery that the meeting actually took 
place on December 22, 1988, rather than December 29, 
1988. DeVany testified at his deposition that he changed 
the date of the meeting at Hurst's insistence, but Hurst 
denied that he ever ordered DeVany to do so. As described 
below, the closing date of the City Collateral sale was 
December 29, 1988. DeVany also testified that he changed 
the date of the customer history after the HonFed sale, but 
insofar as we can tell, his testimony does not indicate when 
Hurst asked him to change the date. 
 
In the weeks prior to the closing, Ridder sent Gerry 
Czarnecki ("Czarnecki"), the chairman of the board of 
HonFed, a memorandum dated December 9, 1988, entitled 
"HonFed/CityFed Negotiations." The district court described 
the memorandum as containing "various recommendations 
that appear to run counter to City Federal's interest." Op. 
at 12-13. One of the items Ridder discussed in the 
memorandum was the Northwest credit line; in particular, 
he recommended that HonFed accept the Northwest credit 
line under certain conditions, and suggested the following 
course of action: "Your bargaining position [with City 
Federal] should be that if the credit does not improve to an 
`acceptable' or `pass' level (currently rated substandard by 
HonFed) rated by HonFed credit exam by March 31, 1989, 
that then all outstandings outstanding at that date are to 
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be repurchased by [City Federal.]" SA at 59. Importantly, 
the memorandum confirmed that the Northwest credit line 
was in technical default, and that Northwest "had excessive 
stale loans in warehouse due to operating problems and 
commitment glitches." Id. Ridder did not distribute the 
memorandum to anyone at City Federal, nor was it found 
in City Federal's files. 
 Notably, City Federal executive James McTernan testified 
at his deposition that no one told him prior to the HonFed 
closing about "operating problems" or "commitment 
glitches" with the Northwest account. See SA 64-65. 
Similarly, McTernan stated in a declaration that he was 
certain that he was not aware of any problems with the 
collateral securing the Northwest loan, and, in his 
deposition, he testified that he did not know that there was 
any technical default of the master agreement precluding 
the renewal of the credit lines. McTernan also indicated in 
his deposition that certain of the statements Ridder made 
in the memorandum were contrary to City Federal's 
interests, and therefore could have been grounds for 
termination. See app. at 552; SA at 65-68. McTernan also 
testified that he would have expected Ridder to circulate the 
memorandum to his superiors at City Federal, given that it 
contained recommendations that ran counter to City 
Federal's interests. See SA at 68. 
 
The district court noted that HonFed decided to exclude 
the Northwest loan from its purchase of City Collateral's 
assets only a "few days" before the closing. Thus, it is 
reasonable to infer that the decision to exclude the loan 
occurred after Movroydis's admission to DeVany, and after 
Hurst became aware of it. See Op. at 13. The record 
supports the conclusion that HonFed made its ultimate 
decision after its receipt of the December 9, 1988, 
memorandum. In late December, and prior to the HonFed 
sale, McTernan asked Ridder how HonFed decided to leave 
the Northwest credit line with City Federal. McTernan 
testified that Ridder replied that HonFed had performed 
due diligence and elected not to purchase the credit line. 
He also indicated that Ridder did not mention the problems 
with the Northwest account at that time. 
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At or about the same time as the closing on December 
29, 1988, Ridder, Hurst, and Merkle entered into 
employment contracts with HonFed providing for various 
benefits including incentive compensation and automobile 
expenses. Also, HonFed provided each individual with a 
signing bonus: Ridder received $42,000, Hurst received 
$26,250, and Merkle received $22,500. They also received 
monthly salaries of $11,667, $8,750, and $7,500, 
respectively. Ridder, Hurst and Merkle earned the 
maximum payments under their "golden handcuff " 
agreements: Ridder received approximately $279,000, Hurst 
received approximately $206,000, and Merkle received 
$150,000. See Op. at 14. Moreover, it appears that DeVany 
received $1,000 from a bonus pool Ridder, Hurst and 
Merkle established voluntarily. F&D's Br. at 9. 
 After the closing, City Federal created First Collateral 
Financial Services ("First Collateral") to assume City 
Collateral's former duties. In January 1989, Northwest 
defaulted on its obligations on the credit line; it failed to 
make payments due on January 1, 1989, and February 1, 
1989. On February 15, 1989, DeVany, who continued to 
administer the Northwest credit line after the sale, provided 
City Federal with a status report that revealed problems 
with the credit line. The district court indicated in its 
opinion that DeVany's memorandum marked the first time 
that anyone at City Federal had been advised of the 
problems with the line. See Op. at 14. We note, however, 
that evidence in the record indicates that City Federal 
employees, including McTernan, knew generally in late 
January 1989, that there were problems with the credit 
line. In any event, the important point is that City Federal 
officials were kept in the dark with respect to the nature 
and severity of the situation until after the completion of 
the HonFed sale. On February 24, 1989, Movroydis met 
with City Federal executives and admitted that he 
misappropriated City Collateral funds. This was thefirst 
time that anyone at City Federal learned of the Movroydis 
admission and the details of his kiting scheme, despite the 
fact that DeVany and Hurst knew about the situation in 
December 1988, prior to the HonFed closing. 
 
City Federal's senior in-house counsel, Amy Stein, Esq. 
("Stein"), learned of the Northwest situation on March 6, 
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1989. At that point, Stein and A. Eugene Hull, Esq. ("Hull"), 
another in-house attorney at City Federal, commenced an 
investigation into the Northwest matter because they were 
concerned that employee misconduct may have caused the 
Northwest loss, thus triggering coverage under the F&D 
fidelity bond. 
 
On March 20, 1989, after interviewing DeVany and 
Merkle, Hull drafted a letter entitled "Notice of Possible 
Loss," and sent it to F&D. The letter essentially tracked the 
language of the discovery definition in the bond, but 
provided no specific details concerning the factual basis for 
City Federal's belief that a covered loss had occurred. 
 
The following day, March 21, 1989, Hull sent a 
supplemental letter to F&D. He estimated that City Federal 
incurred a $7 million loss on the Northwest account, but he 
again provided no specific information concerning the basis 
for his belief that employee misconduct caused the loss. 
 
On March 30, 1989, F&D sought additional facts from 
Hull concerning the suspect transaction, the losses 
sustained to date, the basis for City Federal's suspicion 
that employee dishonesty was involved, and any other 
information City Federal was willing to share. Unsatisfied 
with Hull's response to that letter, F&D wrote to Hull again 
on April 25, 1989. Specifically, F&D sought additional 
information concerning the factual basis for City Federal's 
suspicion that one or more of its employees was involved in 
fraudulent or dishonest conduct causing the Northwest 
loss. Hull did not respond to the correspondence, and F&D 
sent another letter seeking the same information on August 
9, 1989. Again City Federal's legal department did not reply 
to F&D's correspondence. 
 
Subsequently on December 7, 1989, the Director of the 
Office of Thrift Supervision, Department of the Treasury, 
declared City Federal insolvent and ordered it closed. The 
order also appointed the RTC as receiver for City Federal. 
Consequently, the RTC took possession of City Federal on 
December 8, 1989, and succeeded to all its rights, titles, 
assets, powers and interests, including City Federal's right, 
if any, to indemnification under the F&D bond. About two 
weeks later, the RTC filed its "Proof of Loss" with F&D. F&D 
denied the claim for coverage, and this litigation followed. 
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B. Procedural History 
 
The RTC, as City Federal's successor, filed its complaint 
in the district court against F&D, Ridder, Hurst, DeVany 
and Merkle on March 6, 1992, asserting various state law 
claims. Count 1 of the complaint alleged that F&D 
breached its contract with City Federal because it failed to 
indemnify City Federal under the bond for the Northwest 
loss. Count 2 sought a declaratory judgment of coverage 
under the bond, and Count 3 alleged that F&D violated the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by denying 
coverage under the bond.4 
 
F&D filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that 
it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on two 
separate grounds. First, it asserted that "Insuring 
Agreement A," which we call the fidelity provision, did not 
cover the losses caused by the alleged dishonest and 
fraudulent conduct by the individual defendants. 5 It 
claimed that no reasonable jury could find that the 
individual defendants acted with the requisite "manifest 
intent" both to cause a loss to City Federal and to obtain 
the type of financial benefit for a third party or themselves 
that would permit coverage under the bond. Second, F&D 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Counts 4 through 20 alleged various state law claims against Hurst, 
Merkle, Ridder and DeVany. On October 27, 1995, Merkle filed a motion 
for partial summary judgment. The district court denied the motion by 
opinion and order entered January 13, 1997. Merklefiled a motion for 
reconsideration, which the district court granted by letter order entered 
March 6, 1997. However, after considering the issues presented in the 
motion for partial summary judgment for the second time, the court 
denied the motion in its letter order. Merkle filed a motion for 
reconsideration of that last order, which the district court denied by 
letter order entered April 15, 1997. These rulings are not at issue in 
this 
 
appeal. 
 
5. The bond consisted of separate "Insuring Agreements," each of which 
protected against certain internal and external risks. All of the Insuring 
Agreements are subject to a common set of general agreements, 
definitions, conditions, limitations, and exclusions. The agreements, or 
coverages, include: (A) Fidelity, (B) Audit Expense, (C) On Premises, (D) 
In Transit, (E) Forgery or Alteration, (F) Securities, and (G) Counterfeit 
Currency. In this appeal, the RTC claims coverage only under "Insuring 
Agreement A." 
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maintained that under the general discovery definition 
found in section 4 of the "General Agreements" portion of 
the bond, no reasonable jury could conclude that City 
Federal "discovered" the loss during the bond period, as 
required for there to be coverage, even viewing the known 
facts as of March 22, 1989, the date the bond expired, in 
the light most favorable to the RTC. See Op. at 18. 
 
The district court granted F&D's motion in its opinion 
and order entered January 29, 1998, and dismissed the 
RTC's claims against F&D with prejudice. First, the court 
concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact 
as to whether the individual defendants acted with the 
manifest intent to cause City Federal a loss which, at the 
same time, allowed them to obtain the type of financial gain 
that would establish coverage under the bond. The court 
held in the alternative, however, that summary judgment 
was appropriate on the basis that City Federal failed to 
discover the loss within the applicable bond period. See Op. 
at 31-32. The district court subsequently filed an order 
dismissing the action against F&D in its entirety, and after 
the remaining parties settled the case, the RTCfiled a 
timely notice of appeal of the summary judgment order. 
 
III. JURISDICTION, STANDARD OF REVIEW and 
       APPLICABLE LAW 
 
The district court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
over this matter pursuant to 12 U.S.C. S 1441a(l)(1), which 
grants original jurisdiction to district courts over any action 
to which the RTC is a party. The FDIC was subject to 
jurisdiction in the district court by virtue of 12 U.S.C. 
S 1819(b)(2)(A). 
 
We exercise appellate jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, as the district court entered 
a final order dated September 3, 1998, dismissing the 
action. Because the RTC appeals from the district court's 
order of summary judgment entered January 29, 1998, our 
review is plenary. See Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 
383, 385 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Preliminarily, we note that suits brought by the FDIC are 
deemed by statute to arise under the laws of the United 
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States. See 12 U.S.C. S 1819(b)(2)(A). Nevertheless, we treat 
this appeal as governed by the substantive law of New 
Jersey, inasmuch as both parties assume that New Jersey 
law applies, neither party contends that another state's law 
governs, and we see no basis for fashioning a federal rule 
of decision to resolve the issues we address today. See 
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87-88, 114 S.Ct. 
2048, 2055 (1994); FDIC v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 105 
F.3d 778, 779 n.1 (1st Cir. 1997); FDIC v. Oldenburg, 34 
F.3d 1529, 1538 & n.10 (10th Cir. 1994); FDIC v. New 
Hampshire Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 481-82 (9th Cir. 1991). 
In this regard, however, we note that many of the germane 
cases are from the federal courts as, not surprisingly, 
diversity jurisdiction frequently is present in litigation 
involving fidelity bonds. The cases often state common law 
principles which are not unique to any particular state. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
A. "Discovery" of the Loss 
 
The RTC contends primarily that the district court erred 
in concluding that City Federal failed to discover the basis 
for its claim under the bond prior to the bond's expiration 
on March 22, 1989, as required for there to be coverage. It 
maintains that the issue of when the loss was "discovered" 
under the bond is inherently factual and thus properly is 
reserved for the trier of fact. It claims that the facts City 
Federal knew as of the expiration of the bond period, when 
considered in combination, were sufficient under the bond's 
discovery standard so that the issue should have been 
presented to a jury. 
 
F&D contends in response that the district court's 
disposition of the discovery issue was correct, as the court 
recognized that the information that City Federal learned 
prior to the expiration of the bond period was insufficient to 
warrant a jury finding that it "discovered" the loss as of 
that time. It argues that, at most, the facts and 
circumstances City Federal knew gave rise to suspicions 
about the individual defendants' misconduct, but that 
"mere suspicion of employee dishonesty or wrongdoing 
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during the bond period does not constitute discovery." Br. 
at 24. Citing cases in which the courts ruled in favor of the 
insurer on the issue of discovery, F&D claims they support 
its position because the insureds in those cases possessed 
"far more knowledge of facts about the alleged dishonesty 
than City Federal possessed" during the bond period. See 
id. at 25-28. 
 
The bond at issue is known in the industry as a 
"Standard Form No. 22 bond." It is a "discovery bond," 
which by its terms requires that the insured discover the 
loss during the bond period as a condition to coverage. 
Thus, coverage expressly is limited by the following section, 
which defines "discovery" as the term is used throughout 
the various provisions in the bond: 
 
       Section 4. This bond applies to loss discovered by the 
       Insured during the bond period. Discovery occurs when 
       the Insured becomes aware of facts which would cause 
       a reasonable person to assume that a loss covered by 
       the bond has been or will be incurred, even though the 
       exact amount or details of loss may not then be known. 
 
App. at 100. Moreover, section 5 of the General Agreements 
section of the bond states that "[a]t the earliest practicable 
moment, not to exceed 30 days after discovery of the loss, 
the Insured shall give the underwriters notice thereof." Id. 
 
During the summary judgment proceedings before the 
district court, the RTC argued that a reasonable jury could 
find that City Federal discovered the loss during the bond 
period, given the information City Federal knew prior to the 
expiration of the bond period, and the discovery standard 
that applied. It relied on several pieces of information of 
which members of City Federal's legal department were 
aware as of March 20, 1989, the date City Federal sent its 
Notice of Possible Loss letter to F&D. Thus, its position 
essentially was that the facts City Federal knew showed 
that it possessed more than "mere suspicions of 
dishonesty." Specifically, it cited Stein's deposition 
testimony which detailed the various pieces of information 
City Federal's legal department discovered during the bond 
period. Because the nature and extent of City Federal's 
knowledge is central to resolving the discovery issue, we 
 
                                16 
 
 
will set forth in some detail the factual basis for the RTC's 
argument. 
 
First, Stein testified that she knew that the Northwest 
loss essentially "dropped out of the sky" without City 
Federal management receiving prior warning from any of 
the individuals responsible for monitoring the loan. She 
testified that it was "unprecedented" that a multi-million 
dollar loss would just appear out of nowhere, without prior 
warning signs being noticed by the employees working on 
the account. Yet, to the best of her knowledge at that time, 
none of the responsible employees revealed any warning 
signs to City Federal personnel. 
 
Second, Stein knew that HonFed specifically excluded the 
Northwest credit line from its purchase of City Collateral's 
assets. Stein testified that it was incredible and very 
peculiar that HonFed would single out the Northwest loan 
and exclude it from the sale, particularly while City Federal 
employees responsible for the loan seemingly were unaware 
of its troubled status. Her testimony in this regard was: 
 
       MS. STEIN: I mean, I can't imagine how HonFed could 
       come up to a conclusion like that [i.e., that the loan 
       should be excluded], having no ownership of the loan, 
       where we had bank employees or City Collateral 
       employees who were responsible for this loan. It just 
       didn't square up. I mean, why does a buyer kick out a 
       loan from a purchase? It's just not, you know, karma. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        I just knew the HonFed deal was going down right 
       around this time, and it seemed very peculiar to me 
       that another financial institution kicks this loan out of 
       its purchase. 
 
       MR. KASLOW: Do you know if HonFed conducted any 
       due diligence? 
 
       MS. STEIN: Well, my point is this. If HonFed conducted 
       due diligence and saw something that made it believe 
       that this loan was not, you know, acceptable, where 
       were our employees who were managing this loan and 
       dealing with this borrower, why didn't they also 
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        discover that and why wasn't that brought to 
       management's attention? 
 
Third, Stein knew that DeVany learned of Movroydis's 
fraudulent scheme in late December 1988, but failed to 
report his admission to management at City Federal or City 
Federal's legal department. She knew that DeVany met with 
Movroydis at or around the same time as the HonFed 
closing, and learned at that time that Movroydis converted 
monies Northwest owed to City Collateral and used the 
funds to cover marketing losses Northwest sustained in 
1987. Stein testified that it was "bizarre" and contrary to 
bank policy that DeVany concealed that information rather 
than promptly notifying the legal department that one of its 
borrowers perpetrated a fraud. She explained: 
 
       A borrower walks in, sits down with an account officer 
       [DeVany], confesses to a multimillion dollar fraud, and 
       the account officer doesn't call the legal department for 
       months, the legal department doesn't even find out 
       about it through the account officer? That is, you 
       know, clearly weird. That's just not the way things 
       worked in the real world, it's just not the way it works. 
 
App. at 352. Stein explained later in her deposition that 
City Federal policy required its employees to notify the legal 
department of matters that had "a legal consequence or a 
legal issue" involved. In view of her belief that"certainly 
fraud or theft by a borrower would fall into that category," 
Stein thought DeVany's concealment particularly telling. 
App. at 349, 362. 
 
Finally, Stein cited DeVany's demeanor as an additional 
factor that led her to believe that he had engaged in 
fraudulent or dishonest behavior causing the Northwest 
loss. According to Stein, DeVany did not seem credible 
during his interview with Hull, which occurred shortly 
before the bond period expired and prior to City Federal's 
Notice of Possible Loss letter dated March 20, 1989. The 
RTC also cited Hull's assessment of both DeVany's and 
Merkle's demeanor when he interviewed them. Hull testified 
that he did not find either of them forthcoming with 
information about the Northwest loss, which seemed 
contrary to what one would expect given the circumstances. 
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After reviewing each piece of information, the district 
court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that 
discovery had occurred as of the bond's expiration date. It 
explained that while the circumstances apparently gave rise 
to concern or suspicions that employees concealed 
information from City Federal, there was "no evidence in 
the record to indicate that as of [March] 22, 1989, City 
Federal was aware of any specific dishonest conduct by the 
employees which proximately caused the Northwest loss." 
See Op. at 32. Specifically, the court noted that Stein's 
knowledge of the manner in which Northwest learned of the 
loss and her awareness of the fact that HonFed decided to 
exclude the account from the purchase did not provide a 
basis for assuming that the employees responsible for the 
administration of the credit lines caused the loss. Moreover, 
the court discounted the significance of the fact that Stein 
knew that DeVany was aware of Movroydis's scheme prior 
to the HonFed closing but failed to alert City Federal 
management or its legal department, stating: 
 
       DeVany's failure to notify the legal department of the 
       confession is not a definite basis for a careful and 
       prudent person to charge him with fraud or 
       dishonesty. At that time, his omission may have just as 
       easily been classified as neglect. Further, this 
       particular concealment was not the dishonest conduct 
       that directly resulted in the Northwest loss: the culprits 
       were the earlier ongoing misrepresentations of the 
       condition of the credit line that proximately caused the 
       claimed loss from the unpaid loans. 
 
Op. at 33. The court also cited City Federal's failure to 
respond promptly to F&D's requests for additional 
information, and its admission in litigation with its 
subsequent insurer that as of the expiration of the F&D 
bond, City Federal had not determined "the specifics of any 
employee dishonesty in connection with those problem 
loans to Northwest." Op. at 33-34. 
 
In reviewing the district court's grant of summary 
judgment, we must determine whether there is a genuine 
issue of material fact for trial on the issue of whether City 
Federal discovered the loss during the bond period. See 
FDIC v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 928 F. Supp. 54, 58 (D. 
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Mass. 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 105 F.3d 778 (1st Cir. 
1997). In this connection, we must view the facts in the 
light most favorable to City Federal and determine if a 
reasonable jury could conclude that a reasonable person 
would have assumed, based on the information City Federal 
knew as of March 22, 1989, that a covered loss had or 
would be incurred. Stated differently, summary judgment 
against the RTC on this issue of discovery was warranted 
only if there was no material dispute that the information 
City Federal knew provided an insufficient basis for a 
reasonable person to assume that a loss covered by the 
bond had or would be incurred. See In re ContiCommodity 
Servs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 1555, 1578 (N.D. Ill. 
1990).6 
 
For the reasons we explain below, we disagree with the 
district court's conclusion that no reasonable jury could 
find that City Federal "discovered" the Northwest loss 
during the bond period. Given the standard of discovery set 
forth in section 4 of the bond, we find that a reasonable 
jury could conclude, based on the information that City 
Federal knew as of the expiration of the bond period, that 
it was aware of sufficient facts that would cause a 
reasonable person to assume that a loss covered by the 
bond had or would be incurred. Accordingly, we will reverse 
the district court's summary judgment on this issue. 
 
To explain our result, we first must set forth our 
understanding of the concept of discovery under the 
standard set forth in the bond. While we recognize that we 
addressed the general idea of "discovery" of a loss under a 
fidelity bond in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Hudson United 
Bank, 653 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1981), this case presents an 
issue of first impression in this circuit inasmuch as it 
requires us to interpret the meaning of the discovery 
standard found in the Standard Form No. 22 bond. 7 To 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In re ContiCommodity Services, Inc., Securities Litigation was a multi- 
district litigation case. See 733 F. Supp. 1555 (N.D. Ill. 1990). Other 
aspects of the district court's opinion, which are not relevant here, were 
affirmed sub nom in ContiCommodity Services, Inc. v. Ragan, 63 F.3d 438 
(5th Cir. 1995), and reversed sub nom in Brown v. United States, 976 
F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 
7. It appears that the RTC is willing to assume that the discovery 
standard we relied upon in Hudson United provides the rule of law that 
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reiterate, discovery occurs under section 4 of the bond 
"when the Insured becomes aware of facts which would 
cause a reasonable person to assume that a loss covered by 
the bond has or will be incurred, even though the exact 
amount or details of the loss may have not then been 
known." App. at 565. The date of "discovery" of the loss is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
we should apply here in determining if discovery occurred within the 
bond period. Nevertheless, we do not believe that it is self-evident that 
its 
assumption is correct. In Hudson United, we followed cases holding that 
discovery under a fidelity bond occurs "when a bank has sufficient 
knowledge of specific dishonest acts to justify a careful and prudent 
person in charging another with dishonesty or fraud." Hudson United, 
653 F.2d at 774. We also noted that in defining when a bank "discovers" 
a loss for purposes of filing a notice of loss with its carrier, courts 
have 
held that "[a] bank is not under a duty to notify its insurance carrier 
until it has knowledge of some specific fraudulent act." Id. (citing, 
inter 
 
alia, American Sur. Co. v. Pauly, 170 U.S. 133, 18 S.Ct. 552 (1898)). We 
simply cannot assume that the general discovery principles we cited in 
Hudson United automatically apply here, as our opinion there addressed 
a different issue--namely, whether the insurer was entitled to rescind its 
insurance contract based on the insured's failure to disclose a potential 
loss prior to the commencement of the bond period. See id. And more 
importantly, while we recognize that in Hudson United we found those 
general discovery principles helpful in addressing the question of 
rescission, section 4 of this bond explicitly provides the applicable 
discovery definition at issue in this appeal. See also National Newark & 
Essex Bank v. American Ins. Co., 385 A.2d 1216, 1224-25 (N.J. 1978) 
(addressing concept of discovery under fidelity bond in absence of 
controlling definition). Therefore, inasmuch as the parties contracted for 
a specific discovery provision, our analysis must begin with the plain 
language of the bond. But cf. First Sec. Savs. v. Kansas Bankers Sur. Co., 
849 F.2d 345, 349 (8th Cir. 1988) (construing same discovery definition 
as in the present case and looking to "well-established rule" that insured 
under a fidelity bond is not bound to give notice until he has acquired 
knowledge of some specific or wrongful act) (citing, inter alia, Hudson 
United); see also First Dakota Nat'l Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co. 2 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Kansas Bankers). Of course, 
we recognize that we may look to prior case law in attempting to 
ascertain the intended meaning of the parties' chosen language. See 
generally 13 John A. Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice S 7404 (2d ed. 1976). We simply point out here that we do not 
share the parties' apparent view that the discovery rules we cited in 
Hudson United are dispositive. 
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of practical significance because it not only determines 
whether the loss is covered by the bond, but also triggers 
the insured's obligation to give notice of the possible loss to 
its carrier "at the earliest practical moment, not to exceed 
30 days." Id. 
 
We understand this discovery standard as comprised of 
a subjective and objective component: the trier of fact must 
identify what facts and information the insured actually 
knew during the relevant time period, and it must 
determine, based on those facts, the conclusions that a 
reasonable person could draw from them. Our 
understanding in this connection comports with prior case 
law addressing the concept of "discovery" in the fidelity 
bond context. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. 
Empire State Bank, 448 F.2d 360, 365 (8th Cir. 1971) ("In 
determining when discovery has taken place, the trier of 
fact must find the pertinent underlying facts known to the 
insured and must further determine the subjective 
conclusions reasonably drawn therefrom by the insured.") 
(applying Missouri law in absence of governing definition in 
bond); see also Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 369, 375 
(M.D.N.C. 1959) (adopting rule of law that mirrors discovery 
standard of Standard Form No. 22 bond, and stating that 
"The facts must be viewed as they would have been by a 
reasonable person at the time discovery is asserted, and 
not as they later appeared in the light of subsequently 
acquired knowledge."). 
 
We also agree with F&D's position that the discovery 
definition requires that the insured possess more than 
mere suspicions of employee dishonesty or fraud. See 
Hudson United, 653 F.2d at 774 (citations omitted). Courts 
long have recognized the principle that unsupported 
suspicions of employee misconduct do not constitute 
discovery in the fidelity bond context, see, e.g., National 
Newark & Essex Bank v. American Ins. Co., 385 A.2d 1216, 
1224 (N.J. 1978), and we believe that the language of the 
bond incorporates that requirement by tying the concept of 
discovery to "facts" within the insured's knowledge. Indeed, 
the language "facts which would cause a reasonable person 
to assume" defines the nature of information that the 
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insured must possess in order for it to be charged with 
discovery, and we agree with those courts of appeals which 
have stated that "discovery" of a loss under section 4 does 
not occur until the insured "discovers facts showing that 
dishonest acts occurred and appreciates the significance of 
those facts." See, e.g., FDIC v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 45 
F.3d 969, 974 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting FDIC v. Aetna Cas. 
& Sur. Co., 903 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1990)); see also 
California Union Ins. Co. v. American Diversified Savs. Bank, 
948 F.2d 556, 564 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Aetna Cas., 903 
F.2d at 1079 (citing Empire State Bank, 448 F.2d at 364- 
66); cf. Royal Trust Bank, N.A. v. National Union Fire Ins. 
Co., 788 F.2d 719, 721 n.2 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that 
same discovery definition does not require that the bank 
have enough information to charge its employee with fraud 
or dishonesty; "All that is required is that it have enough 
information to assume that the employee has acted 
fraudulently or dishonestly."). Moreover, we understand the 
objective, "reasonable person" component as permitting the 
trier of fact to analyze the full range of information the 
insured knew so as to determine whether a reasonable 
person would assume, based on all of the circumstances, 
that a covered loss had or would be incurred. See Wachovia 
Bank, 171 F. Supp. at 376-77. 
 
Inevitably, a court must assess each case on its own 
facts, keeping in mind the general principle that the 
"discovery threshold is low." See California Union, 948 F.2d 
at 563; see also Oldenburg, 34 F.3d at 1542 (quoting 
California Union and stating that the " `discovery threshold 
is low' "). Indeed, by adhering to that general principle, we 
remain true to the plain language of the bond. All that it 
requires is that the insured possess sufficient information 
to lead to a reasonable assumption of a covered loss; it 
states specifically that the insured need not know"the 
exact amount or details" of the loss to be charged with 
discovery under section 4.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Parenthetically, we observe that our understanding as to the level of 
knowledge that the bond requires for discovery to occur is informed by 
the reality that, to some extent, the bond places an insured in a 
difficult 
 
predicament. Specifically, we point out that under section 5 of the bond, 
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With these basic precepts in mind, we may consider the 
specific facts of this case. As we have indicated, our review 
of the record leads us to conclude that a reasonable jury 
could find that City Federal possessed sufficient knowledge 
of facts that would cause a reasonable person to assume 
that a covered loss had or would be incurred as of March 
22, 1989. Put simply, we believe that there is more than 
one reasonable conclusion that could be reached based on 
the facts City Federal learned during the crucial days just 
prior to the bond's expiration. First, City Federal knew for 
a fact that DeVany was aware of the Movroydis scheme, 
and committed a dishonest act by concealing the admission 
from City Federal and perhaps more significantly, its legal 
department.9 This is an important piece of information, and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
if the insured waits for too long a period after it is deemed to have 
"discovered" the loss, its insurer may deny coverage. Section 5 requires 
the insured to give notice of the loss within 30 days after "discovery of 
the loss." Indeed, we found cases addressing the concept of "discovery" 
of a loss under a fidelity bond in the context of insurers' claims that, 
as 
 
a matter of law, discovery had occurred prior to the time the insured 
claimed it had. See, e.g., Interstate Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co., 788 F. Supp. 1530, 1533-37 (D. Or. 1992). In these cases, the 
insurers asserted that the insured waited too long after "discovery" of 
the 
 
loss, thus precluding coverage because of the duty to give timely notice. 
Here, in essence, F&D's argument is the opposite: it claims that City 
Federal gave its notice too early rather than too late. 
 
9. The district court discounted the significance of this fact, stating 
that 
"DeVany's failure to notify the legal department of the confession is not 
a definite basis for a careful and prudent person to charge him with 
fraud or dishonesty. At that time, his omission may have just as easily 
been classified as neglect." Op. at 33 (emphasis added). Regardless of the 
district court's views on this point, the RTC was not required to 
demonstrate that the concealment was a definite basis for a reasonable 
person to charge him with fraudulent or dishonest conduct in 
connection with the Northwest loss. Instead, the question at this 
juncture is whether a reasonable jury could conclude on the basis of that 
proof that City Federal possessed sufficient information to constitute 
discovery. Moreover, to the extent the district court recognized that the 
omission could be classified either as neglect or intentional concealment, 
that statement indicates that reasonable minds could differ, thus making 
summary judgment inappropriate. Finally, we also note that the court 
determined that City Federal's discovery of DeVany's concealment was 
not material because that concealment was not the dishonest conduct 
that "directly resulted" in the loss. Op. at 33. But we do not interpret 
the 
discovery definition in the bond as requiring as much. 
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it indicates to us that a jury could conclude that City 
Federal possessed more than mere unsupported suspicions 
of dishonest conduct. Compare California Union, 948 F.2d 
at 564-65 (affirming summary judgment for insurer on 
discovery issue where the evidence arguably showed that 
the insured knew of infractions of banking regulations, but 
there was no testimony to indicate that the non-wrongdoing 
employees knew of dishonest acts by other employees); 
Aetna Cas., 903 F.2d at 1079 (reversing summary 
judgment for FDIC and finding that discovery had not 
occurred during the bond period where the insured had 
suspected employee dishonesty was involved in a potential 
loss, but the suspicions grew from general conditions of 
bank and not from knowledge of any facts which indicated 
that its employee committed any dishonest acts). Moreover, 
City Federal was aware of the circumstance that, even after 
the HonFed sale, DeVany did not inform City Federal or its 
legal department of the Movroydis fraud; instead, City 
Federal learned of it because of Movroydis' admission to its 
management in February 1989. 
 
Of course, a reasonable person would evaluate the 
significance of these facts in the context in which they 
occurred: on or about the same date that Movroydis 
supposedly revealed his fraudulent scheme to DeVany, the 
HonFed deal closed. And in evaluating the importance of 
the timing of the Movroydis admission and DeVany's 
concealment, a reasonable person could find it telling that 
HonFed specifically excluded this account from the City 
Collateral assets it purchased. Indeed, this circumstance 
would appear exceptionally suspect in view of the fact that 
the Northwest loan loss "dropped out of the sky" in the 
sense that City Federal management possessed no 
knowledge of any significant problems with this account, or 
the existence of any loss, until after the closing date. 
Finally, Stein testified that she and Hull perceived DeVany's 
demeanor as "elusive" when they questioned him. While 
their assessment of his behavior would be insufficient, 
standing alone, to satisfy the discovery standard in the 
bond because mere suspicions are not enough to constitute 
"discovery," it certainly lends support to the conclusion that 
a jury could find in favor of the RTC on the discovery issue 
when it is considered in conjunction with the other factual 
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information in City Federal's possession during the relevant 
time period. 
 
It appears to us that the district court overlooked the 
reasonable inferences that a jury could draw from the 
totality of information that City Federal knew during the 
relevant time period. Rather than considering the probative 
force of the information in its totality, the district court 
focused on each piece of information in isolation and 
resolved a disputed factual issue in F&D's favor. We 
recognize that finding the point at which discovery occurred 
is difficult, given the inherently fact-driven nature of the 
inquiry. It may be extremely difficult, then, to determine on 
summary judgment when the insured discovered a loss 
caused by employee dishonesty. Given the set of facts 
before us, we disagree with the district court's ultimate 
finding that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn 
was that City Federal possessed nothing more than 
unconfirmed suspicions of employee misconduct relating to 
the Northwest account. Compare United States Fidelity & 
Guar. Co. v. Maxicare Health Plans, No. 96-2457, 1997 WL 
466802, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 1997) (finding as a matter 
of law at motion for summary judgment that insured 
discovered the loss within the meaning of the same bond 
definition where the insured possessed a similar level of 
knowledge as City Federal); see also Boomershine Pontiac- 
GMC Truck, Inc. v. Globe Indem. Co., 466 S.E.2d 915, 917 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing order of summary judgment 
in favor of insurer in fidelity bond dispute on discovery 
issue, stating that as long as there is room under the 
evidence for a reasonable difference of opinion as to 
whether insured discovered loss, summary judgment is 
inappropriate). 
 
In reaching our conclusion we have considered but 
rejected F&D's arguments in support of the district court's 
resolution of the discovery issue. First, F&D asserts that 
City Federal's admissions in litigation against National 
Union Fire Insurance Company, its insurer that followed 
F&D, belie the RTC's contention that City Federal 
possessed sufficient factual information during the bond 
period for a jury to conclude that it had discovered the loss 
prior to its expiration. Specifically, it argues that "[City 
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Federal] acknowledged the limits of its information in the 
related National Union suit where it admitted that it knew 
of no specifics of any employee dishonesty in connection 
with the Loan prior to March 20, 1989, and further stated 
that much of the information in the proof of loss was 
learned after the Bond period had expired."10 Br. at 32-33. 
Apparently, the district court ascribed significance to the 
RTC's position in the National Union litigation, as it noted 
that the RTC stipulated in the Final Pretrial Order in that 
case that "prior to March 22, 1989, City Federal had not 
determined the specifics of any employee dishonesty in 
connection with those problem loans to [Northwest]." Op. at 
34 (internal quotation marks omitted). It also noted that 
City Federal stipulated that it learned much of the 
information included in the proof of loss during the course 
of the investigation that took place during the late 
summer/early fall of 1989. See id. 
 
F&D has not argued before us that the RTC's stipulations 
in the National Union litigation are binding in this case 
such that City Federal is precluded from asserting that it 
discovered the loss within the F&D bond period. See 
Hudson United, 653 F.2d at 777-78; see generally 9 
Wigmore, Evidence S 2593 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) 
(discussing effect of judicial admissions and explaining that 
statement qualifying as a judicial admission generally is 
binding in subsequent parts of same proceedings between 
the same parties). Instead, we understand the thrust of its 
argument to be that the RTC's position in the National 
Union case undermines its assertion of discovery in this 
case. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. National Union Fire Insurance Co. ("National Union") issued a fidelity 
bond to City Federal which took effect on March 22, 1989, after the F&D 
bond expired. National Union filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey against the RTC, as receiver 
for City Savings Bank, F.S.B. (City Federal's successor), seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the bond was void because City Federal had 
failed to disclose in its bond application that it had sustained the 
Northwest loss. Notably, the RTC did not seek indemnification under the 
National Union bond for the Northwest loan loss. See Compl., National 
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Savings, F.S.B., No. 92-3408 (GEB). We 
understand that the National Union litigation is no longer pending before 
the district court. 
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In our view, the RTC has the better argument here, as it 
recognizes the logical flaw in F&D's argument. Specifically, 
the RTC's stipulation that City Federal learned"much of the 
information included in the proof of loss," after March 
1989, does not mean that sufficient information was not 
available to City Federal prior to the expiration of the F&D 
bond so as to constitute discovery as of that date. Similarly, 
the circumstance that City Federal did not have specific 
information about the nature and scope of the employee 
dishonesty that caused the Northwest loss does not mean 
that what it did know as of March 22, 1989, was 
insufficient to warrant a reasonable assumption that a 
covered loss had or would be incurred, which is all that the 
discovery definition in the bond at issue here requires. 
Therefore, the RTC's statements in the National Union 
litigation are not incompatible with its position here and do 
not persuade us that F&D was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
 
F&D also contends that the vague and conclusory nature 
of City Federal's letters to F&D confirm that as of the 
expiration of the bond period, City Federal possessed 
nothing more than unsupported suspicions of employee 
misconduct. It appears that the district court also ascribed 
significance to the fact that F&D repeatedly sought more 
specific factual information from City Federal, but City 
Federal failed to respond to those requests. Apparently, the 
argument here is that the tone of the letters and City 
Federal's omissions provide objective evidence that it 
possessed no specific information of employee wrongdoing. 
 
Again, while these circumstances could be viewed as 
supportive of F&D's position, they do not demonstrate 
conclusively that F&D is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law on the issue of the date of City Federal's discovery 
under the bond. In short, this argument does not overcome 
the fact that reasonable minds could differ on the discovery 
issue, given the nature of the RTC's proofs submitted at the 
summary judgment proceedings. 
 
Next, F&D points out that throughout Stein's deposition 
testimony, she repeatedly used the word "suspicious" to 
describe her assessment of the circumstances surrounding 
the Northwest loan loss and the individual defendants' 
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involvement in that loss. See Br. at 28-29. It claims that 
Stein's word choice is indicative of the quantity and quality 
of information City Federal possessed at the relevant time, 
and that her testimony actually supports its position that 
no reasonable jury could conclude that City Federal 
discovered the loss during the bond period. 
 
We, however, do not share F&D's belief that Stein's 
deposition testimony demonstrates conclusively that she 
possessed only unsupported suspicions of employee 
misconduct insufficient to constitute discovery under the 
relevant standard. Indeed, review of the relevant deposition 
testimony demonstrates that F&D's argument focuses too 
narrowly on her use of the term "suspicious" without 
examining the context of her statements and the overall 
content of her testimony. We point out that while Stein 
stated that she was suspicious of Ridder, Hurst, Merkle 
and DeVany, she used the word "suspicious" in replying 
specifically to F&D's attorney's question, which asked her if 
she "suspected" that those employees engaged in 
misconduct. See SA at 293. In these circumstances, we do 
not find her responses particularly telling at all. In any 
event, they certainly do not demonstrate that, as a matter 
of law, City Federal did not discover the loss during the 
bond period. Cf. Interstate Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Co., 788 F. Supp. 1530, 1536-37 (D. Or. 1992) 
(rejecting insurer's argument that testimony of member of 
loan committee demonstrated that insured discovered loss 
where employee stated only that he had a "feeling" that the 
loans were questionable). 
 
Moreover, other aspects of Stein's deposition testimony 
confirm that, in her view, the information she knew as of 
March 22, 1989, pointed to the conclusion that employee 
misconduct was involved in the Northwest loan loss, and 
thus that the loss was not the result of an employee's poor 
business judgment or negligence. For example, Stein stated 
specifically that with respect to DeVany's concealment of 
the Movroydis admission, she "ruled out the concept that it 
was negligence versus misconduct in regard to the 
concealment. . . . I mean, there's no-no way to my way of 
thinking that that was the result of negligence." App. at 
374. Thus, we are not faced with a situation where the 
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evidence shows only that City Federal knew of the existence 
of the loss, but had not yet reached the subjective 
conclusion that employee dishonesty somehow was 
involved. Compare Block v. Granite State Ins. Co., 963 F.2d 
1127, 1130 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming district court's grant 
of summary judgment to insurer where "not one" bank 
official testified to a contemporaneous belief that bank 
employee misappropriated money during coverage period); 
cf. Maxicare Health Plans, No. 96-2457, 1997 WL 466802, 
at *5 (granting summary judgment to insurer where it 
argued that insured discovered loss prior to commencement 
of insurer's bond; court noted that insured's actions in 
terminating contract suggested that it subjectively believed 
it suffered a loss precipitated by employee dishonesty). 
 
Finally, we note that F&D relies on cases in which the 
courts ruled in favor of the insurer on the issue of 
discovery, and contends that they are factually analogous 
to this case and thus support the district court's finding in 
its favor on that point. Br. at 26-27 (citing Block, 963 F.2d 
at 1129-30; California Union, 948 F.2d at 564-65; Aetna 
Cas., 903 F.2d at 1079). We need not tarry on this 
argument, however, as we do not agree with F&D's 
assessment that these cases are factually analogous. Put 
simply, the cases F&D cites in support of its position do not 
compel the conclusion it seeks because the outcome of 
each case, as in the present case, turned on its unique 
facts. Accordingly, a comparison of the quality and quantity 
of information within the insureds' knowledge in those 
cases ultimately does not persuade us that the district 
court's disposition of the issue at the summary judgment 
stage was appropriate. 
 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, we disagree 
with the district court's assessment of the legal significance 
of the known facts as of March 22, 1989. We hold that the 
district court erred in concluding that no reasonable jury 
could find that City Federal "discovered" the loss during the 
bond period, and accordingly, we hold that summary 
judgment in F&D's favor was inappropriate. 
 
B. Coverage under the Fidelity Provision 
 
F&D argues in the alternative that if we find that the 
district court erred in its analysis pertaining to the 
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discovery issue, we should uphold the district court's order 
for summary judgment because the RTC cannot establish 
at trial that the Northwest loss falls within the narrow 
scope of coverage the bond provides. F&D's overarching 
argument is that the fidelity provision of the Standard Form 
No. 22 bond provides coverage in very limited instances, 
and by its terms only insures against a specific type of risk. 
From that initial premise, it claims that the loss City 
Federal incurred on the Northwest loan does not fall within 
the narrow parameters of coverage. 
 
The RTC contends that the district court's disposition of 
these issues is not before us because F&D did notfile a 
cross-appeal from the January 29, 1998 order for summary 
judgment. We disagree with the RTC's position that F&D 
was required to cross-appeal in order to advance these 
arguments for our consideration, as it is clear that we may 
affirm the judgment on grounds alternative to those on 
which the district court relied. See Rite Aid, Inc. v. 
Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 853 (3d Cir. 1999) (dismissing 
cross-appeals and stating "we point out that[appellees] are 
not by their cross-appeals seeking additional relief. . . . 
Rather, they advance the issue as an alternative ground to 
affirm the summary judgment and injunction."); E.F. 
Operating Corp. v. American Bldgs., 993 F.2d 1046, 1048 
(3d Cir. 1993) ("It is also well established that an appellee 
may, without taking a cross-appeal, support the judgment 
as entered through any matter appearing in the record, 
though his argument may attack the lower court's 
reasoning or bring forth a matter overlooked or ignored by 
the court."); Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 78 n.8 (3d Cir. 
1984). Accordingly, we will consider F&D's arguments as 
alternative grounds to affirm the judgment. 
 
The bond does not afford coverage under its fidelity 
provision for all losses resulting directly from fraudulent 
and dishonest employee conduct. The fidelity provision sets 
forth a subclass or type of dishonest or fraudulent conduct 
that may be covered under the bond. It promises to 
indemnify the insured for: 
 
       (A) Loss resulting directly from dishonest or frau dulent 
       acts of an employee committed alone or in collusion 
       with others. 
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       Dishonest or fraudulent acts as used in this Insuring 
       Agreement shall mean only dishonest or fraudulent 
       acts committed by such Employee with the manifest 
       intent: 
 
       (a) to cause the Insured to sustain such loss, and 
 
       (b) to obtain financial benefit for the Employee or for 
       any other person or organization intended by the 
       employee to receive such benefit, other than 
       salaries, commissions, fees, bonuses, promotions, 
       awards, profit sharing, pensions or other employee 
       benefits earned in the normal course of 
       employment. 
 
App. at 562 (emphasis added). Broken down into its 
components, this provision requires that the following 
elements be present in order for a loss to constitute a 
covered event: (1) the insured must incur a loss; (2) the loss 
must have "result[ed] directly" from dishonest or fraudulent 
acts of an employee or employees; (3) the employee must 
have committed the acts with the "manifest intent" to cause 
the insured to suffer the loss sustained (which we call 
"subsection (a)'s requirement"); and (4) the employee must 
have committed the acts with the "manifest intent" to 
obtain a financial benefit for the employee or a third party, 
and the financial benefit obtained must not be of the type 
covered by the exclusionary clause (which we call 
"subsection (b)'s requirement"). See Jeffrey M. Winn, 
Fidelity Insurance and Financial Institutions in the Post- 
FIRREA Era, 109 Banking L.J. 149, 151-52 (Mar.-Apr. 
1992). If F&D can establish, as a matter of law, that at 
least one of those requirements is not satisfied in this case, 
it would not be required to indemnify City Federal because 
the Northwest loss would not constitute a covered event. In 
that circumstance, we would affirm the district court's 
order for summary judgment on this alternative basis. 
 
F&D concedes that the RTC established that City Federal 
suffered a loss on the Northwest account, but contends 
that the remaining elements necessary for coverage under 
the fidelity provision are absent in this case. Specifically, its 
arguments may be broken down into two broader 
categories. First, F&D asserts that there is insufficient 
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evidence from which a jury could conclude that the 
individual defendants acted with the "manifest intent" (1) to 
obtain for themselves or a third party a type offinancial 
benefit covered by the bond, and in turn (2) to cause City 
Federal to sustain the Northwest loss. Second, F&D 
maintains that there is insufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could conclude that the Northwest loss 
"result[ed] directly" from the individual defendants' 
dishonest and fraudulent actions that form the basis for 
this lawsuit. 
 
We will address these arguments in the following 
manner. In subsection (1) below, we first must ascertain 
the correct definition of the term "manifest intent" as it is 
used in the fidelity provision. We then must decide whether 
the RTC has presented sufficient evidence that the 
employees acted with the "manifest intent" to obtain a 
financial benefit for themselves or a third party that does 
not fall within the category of benefits specifically excluded 
by subsection (b), as that inquiry informs the remainder of 
our analysis. We will conclude by examining whether there 
is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
find that the employees acted with the manifest intent to 
cause City Federal to sustain a loss on the Northwest credit 
line. In subsection (2), we will address separately F&D's 
causation argument, and consider whether there is 
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
conclude that the Northwest loss "result[ed] directly" from 
the individual defendants' dishonest and fraudulent acts. 
As we will explain in greater detail below, we have 
concluded, based on the bond's language and the proofs 
the RTC presented at the summary judgment proceedings, 
that there are genuine issues of material fact pertaining to 
each element described above. Therefore, while we reach 
our conclusion on different grounds than those on which 
the district court relied, we agree with its ultimate 
determination which we described above, that a jury could 
find that the Northwest loss falls within the narrow 
parameters of coverage. 
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1.     Whether the individual defendants committed dishonest 
       and fraudulent acts with the manifest intent to cause 
       City Federal to sustain the Northwest loss and to obtain 
       a certain type of financial benefit for themselves or a 
       third party 
 
a. The meaning of "manifest intent" 
 
In order to determine if the RTC has presented sufficient 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that 
the individual defendants acted with the "manifest intent" 
to cause the Northwest loan loss and to obtain a certain 
type of financial benefit for themselves or a third party, we 
must begin by defining the term "manifest intent" in the 
fidelity insurance context. Initially, we point out that it is 
rather obvious that the term "manifest intent" refers to the 
employee's state of mind in engaging in the allegedly 
dishonest or fraudulent acts which the insured claims to 
have caused it a loss covered by the fidelity bond. 
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court of New Jersey has not 
identified the meaning of the term under New Jersey law, 
our task is to predict how that court would decide this issue.11 
See McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661 (3d 
Cir. 1980). And, as is evident from our discussion that 
follows, the answer is not resolved easily, as it appears that 
there has been considerable debate among various state 
and federal courts concerning the proper formulation of the 
standard. See Christopher Kirwan, Mischief or "Manifest 
Intent"? Looking for Employee Dishonesty in the Unchartered 
World of Fiduciary Misconduct, 30 Tort & Ins. L.J. 183, 186 
(Fall 1994) ("In the eighteen years since its introduction the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We note that the New Jersey Supreme Court in National Newark 
discussed the meaning of the phrase "dishonest or fraudulent acts" in 
the context of a fidelity bond. It held that the phrase encompassed "any 
acts which show a want of integrity or a breach of trust," and "conduct 
which indicates a reckless, willful and wanton disregard for the interest 
of the employer if it be an act manifestly unfair to the employer and 
palpably subjects him to likelihood of loss." National Newark, 385 A.2d 
at 1222 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, as 
F&D correctly notes in its brief, the bond at issue in National Newark did 
not contain the manifest intent limitation which is the subject of the 
parties' dispute in this case. 
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term `manifest intent' has become the major battlefield in 
dishonesty coverage disputes."). 
 
In virtually all of the cases we have found, courts have 
interpreted the term "manifest" as meaning that the intent 
of the employee must be "apparent or obvious." See, e.g., 
Oldenburg, 34 F.3d at 1539; FDIC v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co., 942 F.2d 1032, 1035 (6th Cir. 1991); North Jersey 
Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 660 A.2d 
1287, 1291 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1993); see also 11 
Lee R. Russ and Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d 
S 161:3 (1998). The divergence of opinion, however, stems 
from the issue of whether the "intent" aspect of the phrase 
"manifest intent" requires an inquiry into the employee's 
actual purpose in engaging in the conduct at issue. While 
the fidelity provision covers only those dishonest or 
fraudulent acts undertaken with the manifest intent both to 
(1) cause the insured (who is also the employer) to sustain 
a loss, and (2) obtain a certain type of financial benefit, the 
question of the meaning of "intent" usually arises in the 
context of determining whether the proofs show that the 
former requirement has been satisfied. Indeed, in virtually 
all of the cases interpreting the term "intent," the analysis 
has focused on whether the evidence showed that the 
employees possessed a "manifest intent" to cause the 
insured's loss. Of course, this is not surprising, given the 
fact that most cases turn on this element, as it presents 
difficult proof problems for the insured. 
 
Following this method of analysis, succinctly stated, the 
initial question is whether the insured must establish that 
the employee acted with the specific purpose or desire to 
cause the insured to sustain the loss that it did. The 
related issue then is the type of circumstantial evidence 
relevant to the insured's burden of proof on this point. 
 
In determining the appropriate construction of the 
"manifest intent" state of mind requirement, a review of the 
purpose and history behind its inclusion in bonds of this 
type is instructive. The Surety Association introduced the 
"manifest intent" language in its standard form bond in 
1976 to ameliorate the effect of previous cases in which the 
courts expanded the concept of employee dishonesty to the 
point where the term included any act of the employee (or 
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any failure to act), regardless of motive. See  Michael Keeley, 
Employee Dishonesty Claims: Discerning the Employee's 
Manifest Intent, 30 Tort & Ins. L.J. 915, 919 (Summer 
1995); see also Winn, supra at 152 ("According to an 
influential subcommittee report issued by the Surety 
Association of America in January 1976, insurers added 
the definition of dishonesty because [a] major factor in poor 
results . . . has been a well-established pattern by the 
courts to expand the concept of dishonesty to the point 
where the term now seems to include any act . . . 
regardless of motive, which results in an injury to the 
employer.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Surety Ass'n of Am. Sub-Committee, Revision of the 
Dishonesty Insuring Agreement of Form 24, at 1 (1976)). 
Thus, as one commentator explained: "Insuring Agreement 
A [which contains the manifest intent requirement] was 
revised to clarify the Surety Association's long-standing 
intent, dating back to Standard Form No. 1 in 1916, to 
limit loan losses to claims in which the culpable employee 
acted with the intent or purpose to gain a benefit at the 
expense of his employer--in other words, when the 
employee intended to defraud the insured bank of money." 
Keeley, supra at 919. 
 
Against this background, we must examine the different 
standards courts have adopted in defining the bond's 
"manifest intent" requirement. To date, the Courts of 
Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits have 
adopted the following standard of culpability: "Although the 
concept of manifest intent does not necessarily require that 
the employee actively wish for or desire a particular result, 
it does require more than a mere probability. . . . Manifest 
intent exists when a particular result is substantially 
certain to follow from conduct." See Peoples Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 
1997) (applying Virginia law and quoting St. Paul Fire & 
Marine, 942 F.2d at 1035) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Oldenburg, 34 F.3d at 1539 (citing FDIC v. United 
Pac. Ins. Co., 20 F.3d 1070, 1078 (10th Cir. 1994)) 
(applying Utah law); United Pac., 20 F.3d at 1078 
(interpreting "manifest intent" under general principles of 
federal common law); Heller Int'l Corp. v. Sharp, 974 F.2d 
850, 857-59 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying Illinois law and 
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quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine, 942 F.2d at 1035); St. Paul 
Fire & Marine, 942 F.2d at 1035. But cf. First Fed. Savs. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 1164, 1167 
(10th Cir. 1991) (affirming order of summary judgment for 
insurer, explaining that employee did not possess a 
manifest intent to injure the bank, his employer, where 
evidence pointed to only one conclusion: that employee 
arranged transactions that "hopefully" would be beneficial 
to both the bank and borrowers). This standard, which 
requires only that the loss was "substantially certain to 
follow" from the employee's conduct, was articulated by the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in St. Paul Fire & 
Marine, see 942 F.2d at 1035, which in turn relied on 
language from Hanson PLC v. National Union Fire Insurance 
Co., 794 P.2d 66, 72 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). 
 
In stating that the "manifest intent" standard is satisfied 
either by proof of the employee's desire to cause a loss or by 
proof that the loss was "substantially certain" to result, 
these cases embraced a different, and less culpable mental 
state, than if the standard required that the evidence show 
that it was the employee's specific purpose or desire to 
cause the insured to sustain the loss and obtain afinancial 
benefit at the insured's expense. Indeed, one commentator 
described this "substantially certain to follow" standard as 
requiring, in essence, a level of mental culpability 
equivalent to the general intent concept embodied in the 
area of criminal and tort law. See Keeley, supra at 937; see 
also Affiliated Bank/Morton Grove v. Hartford Accident & 
Indem. Co., No. 91-C-4446, 1992 WL 91761, at *4-5 (N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 23, 1992) (stating that the definition of intent that 
it adopted, i.e., that an employee acts with the manifest 
intent when the evidence demonstrates either (1) that the 
purpose was to achieve the particular result or (2) that the 
person knows that the particular result is substantially 
certain to follow from his or her conduct, is consistent with 
concept of intent in tort law); see also United Pac., 20 F.3d 
at 1078 (stating that jury instructions 36 and 37 provided 
"general intent" standard that was a correct explication of 
the meaning of "manifest intent"); Hanson PLC, 794 P.2d at 
72. Moreover, the concept of general intent is synonymous 
with the Model Penal Code's mental state "knowingly," as a 
person acts knowingly under the Model Penal Code if he or 
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she is aware that " `a result is practically certain to follow 
from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to the 
result.' " See Keeley, supra at 923-24. 
 
Thus for example, in United Pacific, the Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit upheld jury instructions stating, inter 
alia: "the concept of manifest intent does not require that 
the employee wish or desire for a particular result, but it 
does require that the result be substantially certain to 
happen' "; " `You may consider it reasonable to draw the 
inference and find that a person intends the natural and 
probable consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly 
omitted' "; and " `There was an intent to cause the bank to 
sustain a loss if the natural result of [the employee's] 
conduct would be to injure the Bank even though it may 
not have been his motive.' " Id. at 1077-78 (citing Heller, 
974 F.2d at 859; St. Paul Fire & Marine, 942 F.2d at 1035; 
First Nat'l Bank v. Lustig, 961 F.2d 1162, 1166 (5th Cir. 
1992)); see also Oldenburg, 34 F.3d at 1539 (citing United 
Pac., 20 F.3d at 1078). 
 
In contrast to the construction of "manifest intent" 
adopted by the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh 
and Tenth Circuits, the Courts of Appeals for the Second, 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits have applied the term"manifest 
intent" differently, and we read those cases as requiring 
that the insured establish that the employee acted with the 
specific purpose or desire to both injure the insured and 
obtain a benefit. See General Analytics Corp. v. CNA Ins. 
Cos., 86 F.3d 51, 54 (4th Cir. 1996); Lustig , 961 F.2d at 
1166-67; Glusband v. Fittin Cunningham & Lauzon, Inc., 
892 F.2d 208, 210-12 (2d Cir. 1989) (reversing judgment 
for insured's receiver and entering judgment for insurer, 
stating that there was insufficient evidence that the 
employee acted with the manifest intent to cause a loss and 
obtain a financial benefit; court explained that manifest 
intent language limits coverage to losses caused by 
embezzlement and embezzlement-like acts, and that the 
evidence showed only that the employee intended to benefit 
the company rather than cause it a loss); Leucadia, Inc. v. 
Reliance Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 964, 972-74 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(affirming judgment for insurer where the only reasonable 
conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence 
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introduced at trial was that the employee's dishonest 
actions were the result of attempts to save the employer 
from sustaining a large loss).12 In this regard, the "manifest 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not 
stated expressly that the term "manifest intent" covers only those acts 
undertaken with the purpose or desire of causing the employer's loss 
and obtaining a financial benefit, but a review of the facts and 
circumstances in Glusband, see 892 F.2d at 208, and Leucadia, see 864 
F.2d 964, indicate that the court applied the manifest intent standard by 
focusing on the employee's subjective purpose in engaging in the 
wrongful acts at issue. For example, in Leucadia, the employee engaged 
in various dishonest and fraudulent acts that eventually contributed to 
his employer's substantial losses on loans he originated. See 864 F.2d at 
972-74. The nature of the employee's wrongful acts in Leucadia clearly 
were such that a jury could have concluded that by engaging in that 
course of conduct, he knew that a loss to his employer was substantially 
certain to result. See id. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the jury's 
judgment for the insurer, reasoning that the evidence did not 
demonstrate that the employee's dishonest acts were undertaken with 
the manifest intent to cause a loss or obtain afinancial benefit. And the 
court in Glusband explained the holding in Leucadia by referencing the 
employee's object in engaging in the course of conduct at issue, and 
stating that "[b]ecause the employee misguidedly hoped to benefit his 
employer and received no personal gain from the transaction, we held 
that the requisite manifest intent had not been shown." 892 F.2d at 211. 
By referencing the employee's "hopes" (albeit misguided) in engaging in 
the misconduct, the court clearly was concerned with the employee's 
subjective purpose rather than whether the loss was substantially likely 
to result from the employee's actions. See Jane Landes Foster, et al., 
Does a Criminal Conviction Equal Dishonesty? Criminal Intent Versus 
Manifest Intent, 24 Tort. & Ins. L.J. 785, 799-800 (Summer 1989) 
(interpreting Leucadia as applying a subjective purpose test despite the 
fact that the court did not use the word "purposeful" in its opinion). 
 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Lustig 
did not state explicitly that the term "intent" requires proof of purpose 
or 
desire to cause the a loss and obtain a financial benefit for the employee 
or a third party. Nevertheless, insofar as the court's reasoning clearly 
focuses on the employee's purpose or motive in engaging in the 
dishonest or fraudulent acts at issue and the ways in which the bank 
could prove that element, see 961 F.2d at 1165-67, its approach 
demonstrates its adherence to a standard of culpability greater than that 
suggested by the "substantially certain" or knowingly standard. Compare 
id. with United Pac., 20 F.3d at 1077-78; see also Keeley, supra at 932- 
33 (stating that Lustig appears to require an inquiry into the employer's 
purpose). 
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intent" requirement thus may be analogized loosely to the 
concept of "specific intent" in the criminal law context. See 
Keeley, supra at 942 (advocating the adoption of a specific 
intent standard for purposes of defining "manifest intent"); 
Judy L. Hlafesak, Comment, The Nature and Extent of 
Subrogation Rights of Fidelity Insurers Against Officers and 
Directors of Financial Institutions, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 727, 
731-32 (1986) (stating that "manifest intent" language of 
1976 form rider required proof of the employee's specific 
intent to cause a loss). 
 
An instructive example of this approach is found in the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's opinion in General 
Analytics. See 86 F.3d at 54. There the insured, General 
Analytics Corp. ("GA"), sought coverage under a fidelity 
bond for losses it incurred as a result of an employee's 
actions in altering incoming purchase orders sent by the 
insured's customer, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), for 
computer products. Not realizing that the purchase orders 
had been altered, GA personnel filled the IRS's requests by 
ordering parts from a third-party supplier. When GA 
delivered the parts to the IRS, it refused acceptance, 
causing GA to sustain a large loss. The district court 
granted summary judgment to GA against its insurer, 
finding that the evidence showed beyond any factual 
dispute that the employee acted with the manifest intent to 
benefit a third party. See id. at 52-53. 
 
The court of appeals reversed the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to GA, finding that reasonable minds 
could differ as to whether the loss was caused by employee 
misconduct undertaken with the manifest intent to obtain 
a financial benefit for a third party. Because the parties 
disputed the district court's construction of the term 
"manifest intent," the court of appeals analyzed its meaning 
in the fidelity bond context. The court recognized that 
"employee dishonesty policies" are "designed to provide 
coverage for a specific type of loss characterized by 
embezzlement, which involves the direct theft of money." Id. 
at 53. The court then explained that: 
 
        Because employee dishonesty policies like CNA 
       Insurance's require proof that the employee have acted 
       to accomplish a particular purpose, they require that 
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       the insured establish a specific intent, analogous to 
       that required by the criminal law. Thus, if a dishonest 
       act has the unintended effect of causing a loss to the 
       employer or providing a benefit to the employee, the act 
       is not covered by the policy. . . . 
 
        As a state of mind, intent is often difficult to prove. 
       And because it is abstract and private, intent is 
       revealed only by its connection with words and 
       conduct. . . . Thus, evidence of both words and 
       conduct is probative of intent, . . . and, because 
       context illuminates the meaning of words and conduct, 
       evidence of the circumstances surrounding such words 
       or conduct, including the motive of the speaker or 
       actor, similarly is admissible. 
 
Id. at 54 (citations omitted). 
 
The court in General Analytics required proof of the 
employee's specific intent or purpose to cause the insured 
loss and to obtain a certain type of financial benefit for 
herself or a third party, but in adopting that state of mind 
requirement as the standard for "manifest intent," it 
recognized that the employee's subjective intent may be 
proven circumstantially by reference to evidence of the 
employee's words, conduct, and the context in which his or 
her actions took place. See also Lustig, 961 F.2d at 1166 
("When an employee obtains fraudulent loans with reckless 
disregard for a substantial risk of loss to the bank, a jury 
may infer from his reckless conduct and surrounding 
circumstances that he intended to cause the loss. . . . The 
jury should be instructed that in answering the question of 
intended loss, it should consider the range of evidentiary 
circumstances, including the relationship between the 
borrowers and the employee, the employee's knowledge of 
the likelihood that the loans would not be repaid, and all 
other surrounding circumstances bearing on the employee's 
purpose.") (citations and quotation marks omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
 
Thus in General Analytics the court permitted 
consideration of both the reckless nature of the employee's 
conduct, and the likelihood that a loss would result from 
the employee's conduct (i.e., the employee's knowledge of 
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the substantial likelihood of the result), in determining 
whether the employee acted with the "manifest intent" to 
cause the insured to sustain a loss. But the court tied the 
significance of those circumstances to a standard of 
employee culpability that required proof that the employee 
acted with the specific purpose to achieve the desired 
result, i.e., a specific intent to cause the loss and obtain a 
financial benefit for herself or a third party. See also 
Susquehanna Bancshares, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. 
Co., 659 A.2d 991, 998 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) ("[W]e hold 
that the `manifest intent' of the employee should be 
ascertained by deciding his true purpose in causing the 
loss. In deciding what the purpose was, both direct and 
circumstantial evidence should be considered, including the 
employee's own testimony as to his purpose as well as any 
evidence indicating the employee knew the loss was 
substantially certain to be the result of his acts."). 
 
A review of the different approaches reveals the obvious 
distinction between the two lines of cases. As is evident 
from our discussion, under either approach, evidence 
tending to show that the employee acted "knowingly" would 
support a jury finding that the employee intended the 
consequences of his actions. Nevertheless, under the 
rationale explicitly adopted in General Analytics, proof of an 
employee's recklessness, or an employee's knowledge that a 
result was substantially certain to occur from the conduct, 
are objective indicia--manifestations--of the employee's 
specific purpose or intent. But neither an employee's 
recklessness or his knowledge that a result was 
substantially certain to occur would satisfy the language of 
the policy, absent that inference of specific intent. Cf. 
Peoples Bank, 113 F.3d at 636 ("Like our sister circuits, we 
recognize that reckless conduct might be evidence--a 
manifestation--of intent. But recklessness itself, without an 
inference of intent, would clearly not satisfy the language of 
the policy, any more than recklessness alone would create 
culpability for a crime requiring specific intent.") (citing 
General Analytics, 86 F.3d at 54). In contrast, those courts 
that have equated the term "intent" with the mental state 
"knowingly" would find that the employee acted with the 
manifest intent where the loss and the benefit were 
 
                                42 
 
 
substantially certain to follow, regardless of whether the 
employee desired such results. 
 
Interestingly in this case, regardless of the standard we 
choose to adopt, we believe that the proofs are sufficient to 
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact concerning the 
employees' "manifest intent." Nevertheless, in view of the 
circumstance that we must remand this case to the district 
court for trial, we believe that it is appropriate at this 
juncture to state specifically which standard we adopt as 
reflecting what we think the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
would hold so as to give guidance to the district court. 
 
We agree with the approach espoused by the Courts of 
Appeals for the Second, Fourth and Fifth Circuits, and hold 
that the term "manifest intent" as it is used in the fidelity 
provision requires the insured to prove that the employee 
engaged in dishonest or fraudulent acts with the specific 
purpose, object or desire both to cause a loss and obtain a 
financial benefit. Inasmuch as we equate the"substantially 
certain to result" standard with the mental state 
"knowingly," we are of the view that "purposefully" rather 
than "knowingly" better captures the meaning of "intent" as 
it used in the fidelity provision, given the history that 
prompted its inclusion in the dishonesty definition and its 
stated purpose. Indeed, we believe that our construction 
strikes an appropriate balance because it comports with the 
drafters' obvious intent to limit the types of employee 
misconduct covered by this provision but ensures that 
proof of the employee's recklessness and the substantial 
likelihood of loss factor into the ultimate inquiry into the 
employee's subjective state of mind. See Keeley, supra at 
925 (noting that the Model Penal Code's definition of 
specific intent supports equating "manifest intent" with 
specific intent); Winn, supra at 152 ("We are ready and 
willing to insure against dishonesty, i.e., against improper 
acts of employees committed with an intent to deprive their 
employer of funds or property. We cannot insure against 
violations of instructions or poor business judgment."); see 
also Jane Landes Foster, et al., Does a Criminal Conviction 
Equal Dishonesty? Criminal Intent Versus Manifest Intent, 
24 Tort. & Ins. L.J. 785, 800 (Summer 1989) ("Defining 
manifest intent in terms of purpose is also more in keeping 
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with the intent of the fidelity industry. This clause 
represented a specific response to a growing number of 
decisions that judicially expanded the definition of 
dishonesty by recognizing claims based on reckless 
misconduct. Thus, it is clear that the drafters intended to 
limit coverage by requiring proof of a more particularized 
intent to harm."). 
 
We emphasize, however, that by recognizing that the 
term "manifest intent" requires proof of the employee's 
purpose in engaging in the dishonest or fraudulent acts, we 
are cognizant that the employee's actual subjective state of 
mind virtually is impossible to prove absent resort to 
circumstantial evidence--objective indicia of intent. The 
Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have 
recognized this proof problem, and permitted the insured to 
prove the employee's subjective purpose by introducing 
objective evidence of the employee's intent. See Lustig, 961 
F.2d at 1166; General Analytics, 86 F.3d at 54; see also 
Susquehanna Bancshares, 659 A.2d at 998. And inasmuch 
as proof of recklessness and/or the employee's knowledge 
of the likelihood that a loss was to result both serve as 
manifestations of the employee's specific purpose or design, 
we hold that a jury may consider those factors, along with 
any other objective indicia of intent, in ascertaining the 
employee's state of mind in engaging in the wrongful 
conduct. See Couch 3d, supra S 161:3 (stating that 
"manifest intent" language meant an intent that was 
"apparent or obvious," and indicating that in determining 
the employee's intent or purpose, the court should consider 
the employee's testimony as to what his or her purpose was 
in engaging in the acts, and whether the employee was 
substantially certain that a particular result would be 
achieved, together with external indicia of subjective intent). 
 
In reaching our conclusion, we recognize that our task 
here is limited to deciding the meaning of the term 
"manifest intent" as we believe it would have been decided 
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey had the case arisen in 
the New Jersey courts. See Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 
914 F.2d 360, 378 (3d Cir. 1990). Thus, in addition to 
relying on cases from other jurisdictions, we have 
considered the well-established rules for contract 
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interpretation as they have developed under New Jersey 
law. We note, in particular, that New Jersey adheres to the 
principle of contra proferentum, which requires any 
ambiguities in an insurance contract to be resolved in favor 
of the insured. See Pittston Co. Ultramar Am. Ltd. v. Allianz 
Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 508, 520 (3d Cir. 1997). Nevertheless, 
"[w]hen the terms of an insurance contract are clear, . . . it 
is the function of a court to enforce it as written and not 
make a better contract for either of the parties." New Jersey 
v. Signo Trading Int'l, Inc., 612 A.2d 932, 938 (N.J. 1992) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we 
must not torture the language of a contract to create 
ambiguity where none exists in order to impose liability, 
and we must construe the words of an insurance policy so 
as to adhere to their ordinary meaning. See Longobardi v. 
Chubb Ins. Co., 582 A.2d 1257, 1260 (N.J. 1990). Under 
New Jersey law, ambiguity exists in an insurance contract 
where "the phrasing of the policy is so confusing that the 
average policyholder cannot make out the boundaries of 
coverage." Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 795 
(N.J. 1979). 
 
We have not overlooked the possibility that one could 
argue that given the divergence of opinion concerning the 
correct standard for determining the employee's"manifest 
intent," the term is ambiguous, thus requiring us to invoke 
the principle of contra proferentum. See, e.g., Oritani Savs. 
& Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 821 F. Supp. 286, 
290 (D.N.J. 1991) (rejecting that argument in the context of 
determining appropriate construction of "manifest intent"). 
If that were the case, we would be compelled then tofind 
that the term "intent" requires only that the loss be 
"substantially certain to result," as it is a more lenient 
standard of employee culpability. Here, however, we do not 
believe that the Insuring Agreement is ambiguous because 
we cannot conclude that the "phrasing of the policy is so 
confusing that the average policyholder cannot make out 
the boundaries of coverage." Weedo, 405 A.2d at 795. 
Rather, we find that the principle that courts" `should not 
write for the insured a better policy of insurance than the 
one purchased' " applies squarely to the facts of this case. 
Longobardi, 582 A.2d at 1260 (quoting Walker Rogge, Inc. v. 
Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 562 A.2d 208, 214 (N.J. 1989)). 
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Moreover, we further observe that in performing our task 
of "predicting" how the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
decide this issue, we have reviewed two cases from other 
courts which applied the manifest intent requirement under 
New Jersey law in a manner that supports our result. See 
McKenna, 622 F.2d at 662. First, in Oritani, the district 
court held that the term manifest intent requires the 
employee to possess the "subjective intent" to cause the 
employer loss. See 821 F. Supp. at 291. In reaching its 
conclusion, the court found persuasive the insurer's 
argument that the fidelity provision covers only those losses 
that were caused by "deliberate" conduct motivated by a 
"deliberate" intent. See id. at 288. The court granted the 
insurer's motion for summary judgment because it was 
undisputed that the employee was not a knowing 
participant in the scheme that caused the loss. See id. at 
291. 
 
We find the court's requirement of a "subjective intent" 
particularly noteworthy because the court could have 
reached the same result by adopting the "knowingly" 
standard given the facts of the case, but it chose instead to 
state the standard as requiring an inquiry into the 
employee's motive and subjective state of mind. Thus, the 
court determined that proof of the employee's recklessness 
or negligence would not suffice under the subjective 
standard it adopted, so long as the circumstances 
suggested only that the employee exercised poor business 
judgment and acted with "a pure heart." See id. 
 
Similarly in North Jersey, the New Jersey Superior Court, 
Law Division, granted summary judgment to the insurer in 
a fidelity bond dispute because the evidence submitted 
pertaining to the question of manifest intent showed only 
that the employee exercised poor judgment. See  660 A.2d 
at 1292-93. The North Jersey court, citing, inter alia, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's opinion in 
Leucadia, held that the evidence did not permit a 
reasonable inference that the employee's "motive" or 
"purpose" was to cause a loss to his employer. See id. 
 
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the term"manifest 
intent" requires the insured to demonstrate that it was the 
offending employee's purpose or desire to obtain afinancial 
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benefit for himself or a third party, and to cause the 
insured to sustain a loss. And given that a jury could infer 
such an intent based on circumstantial evidence, an 
insured may survive a motion for summary judgment by 
proffering evidence suggesting that the employee acted 
knowing that it was substantially certain that his or her 
conduct would cause the insured to sustain a loss that 
would inure to the employee's benefit, see Lustig, 961 F.2d 
at 1166-67, and by offering any other proof tending to 
establish the employee's intent. See also General Analytics, 
86 F.3d at 54 (stating that an employee's words and 
conduct are probative of intent, and that the context in 
which the words and conduct occurred also is relevant). 
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